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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED BY APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
1. Whether Silver Creek Investors' ("SCI") written option to purchase 56 acre-
feet of water from High Valley Water Company ("High Valley"), remains an executory 
contract. 
2. Whether High Valley breached the contract in 1987 or by 1994. 
3. Whether SCI should be estopped from claiming its continuing rights under 
the Option. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE OPTION AGREEMENT REMAINS EXECUTORY 
High Valley argues that the Option portion of the parties agreement is not 
executory and was breached despite the fact the parties retain outstanding obligations to 
one another. As High Valley properly noted, SCI established at trial that the Option was 
properly and fully exercised in 1987. (R. 321ffl[ 19, 23, 30, 31). However, High Valley 
overlooks the fact that exercise of the Option created obligations upon the parties that 
have yet to be performed. As explained more fully in the Brief of Appellant, the Option 
portion of the agreement between the parties can only close or terminate following the 
State Engineer's disposition of the change application requesting the change of use from 
High Valley to SCI and the change application contemplated by the agreement which can 
only be filed by High Valley. (R.0085-86). 
High Valley argues that performance of the Option is not contingent on State 
Engineer approval of the change application. However, that argument is contrary to the 
specific language of the Option which states: 
Upon approval of the application, the parties shall cause the said sum on 
deposition with Silver King Bank to be paid and disbursed to High Valley 
and Atkinson shall pay to High Valley an amount in addition thereto as 
necessary to pay the entire amount of the purchase price in accordance with 
sub-paragraph "3C(2)" above as of the date such payment is made (herein 
"the Closing Date") whereupon the transaction shall be deemed closed, 
([sic] If there is a surplus in said account as of the Closing Date, the surplus 
shall be disbursed to Atkinson. In the event the application is denied, then 
upon issuance of the final order of denial all amounts on deposit with Silver 
King Bank shall be disbursed to Atkinson where-upon all rights and 
obligations of the parties pursuant to paragraph "3C" shall terminate and be 
of no further force or effect. 
(R. 0085-86) (emphasis added). It is clear that the Option portion of the Agreement can 
only close or terminate based upon the ultimate determination of the State Engineer. 
Only upon "approval of the application" can the parties complete the transaction or, 
conversely, only "upon issuance of the final order of denial" will the obligations of the 
parties terminate. The filing of the application by High Valley is, of course, a logical 
prerequisite to approval or denial of the application. 
High Valley confusingly argues that the Option was not contingent upon the State 
Engineer's determination and that High Valley's obligations to SCI under the Option 
would have been complete had High Valley filed the change application and transferred 
the water. (Brief of Appellee p. 27-28). Even if High Valley were correct, and the 
Option did not specifically require the approval of the State Engineer to trigger the 
opportunity to close the transaction. High Valley did not file the change application and 
did not transfer the water to SCI. Therefore, even under High Valley's reading of the 
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Option, High Valley's obligations to SCI remain outstanding and the Option remains 
executory until High Valley's obligations are performed. 
II. BREACH DID NOT OCCUR IN 1987 OR IN 1994 
The parties agree that the statute of limitations begins to run only when a cause of 
action accrues and that a cause of action on a contract accrues only upon breach of the 
contact. Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311, 313 (Utah App. 1987); Upland Industry 
Corporation v. Pacific Robinson Co., 684 P.2d 638, 643 (Utah 1984). High Valley 
incorrectly argues however that its failure to promptly complete its obligations under the 
Option amounted to a repudiation or anticipatory breach in either 1987 when the Option 
was exercised, or in 1994 when the parties met to discuss completion of the Option. 
High Valley first argues that Option required it to act immediately upon notice of 
exercise and payment of the initial deposit and therefore High Valley breached when it 
did not perform immediately following exercise of the Option on December 31, 1987. 
(Brief of Appellee p. 18, 25). Alternatively, High Valley argues that it repudiated, and 
therefore breached, the Option no later than March 1994 when the parties met to discuss 
the status of the Option. (Brief of Appellee p. 19-22, 26). 
It is improper for High Valley to set up its own delay in performance as an excuse 
to its continuing obligation to perform. Kasarsky v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 296 
F. 3d 1331, 1338-1339 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("agency should not be excused from 
performance simply because it failed to perform."). Furthermore, because the Option did 
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not contain a time certain for High Valley to perform its obligations after exercise of the 
Option, breach cannot have occurred until SCI chose to treat High Valley's claimed 
repudiation as a breach. Kasarsky, 296 F.3d at 1336 (citing Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 
13 (1900)). 
Because the Option did not contain a specific time for performance of High 
Valley's obligations after SCI's exercise of the Option, there is no basis for High Valley's 
argument that its failure to immediately file the required change application amountedlo 
a breach as of December 31, 1987. (R. 0085-86). In fact, because SCI did not have an 
immediate need for the water subject to the Option, High Valley did not request, and did 
not expect, the change application to be filed immediately after the exercise of the Option. 
Likewise SCI did not specifically demand performance of High Valley's 
obligations, or accept High Valley's claimed repudiation of the Option as a breach, in 
1994. SCI's development plans did not require water at that time and SCI chose to let the 
water remain at use during that period. When confronted with an anticipatory 
repudiation, such as that now asserted by High Valley, the performing party "can 
immediately treat the anticipatory repudiation as a breach, or can continue to treat the 
contract as operable and urge performance without waiving any right to sue for 
repudiation." Kasco Services Corporation v. Benson. 831 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah 1992)(citing 
United California Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 140 Ariz. 238, 281, 681 P.2d 
390, 433 (Ct. App. 1983); University Club v. Invesco Holding Corp., 29 Utah 2d 1, 3, 504 
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P.2d 29, 30 (1972)). -Moreover, "[a] party that has received a definite repudiation from 
the breaching party to a contract should not be penalized for its efforts to encourage the 
breaching party to perform its end of the bargain." Id. quoting Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. 
Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 725 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Admittedly, there was correspondence 
exchanged and a meeting held among the parties in 1994 where the status of the Option 
was discussed, and even disputed, however, the 1994 discussions did not amount to a 
breach of the Option. 
Indeed, the correspondence exchanged prior to the March 1994 meeting shows that 
there remained confusion among the parties as to whether or not the Option had in fact 
been exercised. In a letter dated January 6, 1994, written to Summit County, High 
Valley's then attorney stated the opinion that the Option "was not exercised as 
contemplated by the agreement and is no longer valid." (R. 346 Ex. P-14). Because 
High Valley was of the mistaken opinion in 1994 that the Option had not been exercised, 
it failure to perform its obligations at, or prior to, that time cannot be considered 
repudiation of the Option.1 Even following the 1994 meeting, uncertainty remained 
regarding the status of the Option. (R. 346 at pp. 58-60). However, it is clear that SCI 
did not choose to treat High Valley's 1994 statements as a breach. SCI continued to 
expect High Valley to transfer the water and to file the change application when SCI 
1
 As noted, this belief was incorrect. The trial court found that the option was in 
fact exercised. 
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ultimately had need of the water. SCI's need for the water did arise in 1999. At that 
time, SCI again approached High Valley to discuss the steps necessary to complete the 
transfer of the water right. (R. 00346 Ex. P-29). It was only at this point that High Valley 
made it clear that it did not intend to fulfill its obligations to SCI under the Option. 
III. SCI IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING ITS CONTINUING 
RIGHTS UNDER THE OPTION 
Although the issue was not addressed by the trial court, High Valley asks the Court 
to adopt the equitable remedy of estoppel and deny SCI its rights under the Option. (Brief 
of Appellee p. 35-36). However, "[i]t is generally accepted that he who seeks equity must 
do equity." Norton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah 1984). "[A] party seeking equity 
must do so with clean hands." LHIWv. DeLorean, 753 P.2d 961, 963(Utah 1988). High 
Valley, having continued to delay performance of its obligations under the Option cannot 
now claim to have clean hands and raise the equitable defense of estoppel to justify its 
own nonperformance. High Valley disingenuously claims that because SCI has not paid 
for water service, High Valley believed that the Option had not been exercised. (Brief of 
Appellee p. 35). However, the trial court found that SCI properly provided written notice 
of its exercise of the Option and made the required initial deposit of funds with Silver 
King Bank. Moreover, by its own terms the Option required payment "of any unpaid 
balance due and owing High Valley pursuant to paragraph "3E" for water service to 
Atkinson from August 1, 1987 to and including the closing date." (R. 0085). Clearly, 
payment for water service payment was not contemplated to occur when the Option was 
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exercised in December 1987, but was ultimately intended to be completed upon closing of 
the Option - an event that has yet to occur. Moreover, High Valley did not bill SCI for 
water service at any time since August 1, 1987. (R. 346 at p. 178). 
High Valley further argues that SCFs failure to protest the Exchange Application 
High Valley filed which included the water subject to the Option should be a basis for 
estoppel. Once again this argument is disingenuous. The Exchange Application 
referenced was filed in 1991 jointly by High Valley and Atkinson Special Service District 
and its filing, in part, was to effectuate other parts of the Agreement between the parties. 
(R. 346 Ex. P-22). Indeed, when it filed the 1991 Exchange Application with the Utah 
State Engineer, High Valley included a copy of the Agreement (including the Option) as 
an exhibit. (R. 346 Ex. P-22). There was no reason for SCI to protest the 1991 Exchange 
Application because it was filed in furtherance of the Agreement between the parties. It 
allowed a stronger water system and furthered High Valley's ability to complete the 
transfer of the water to SCI. (R. 346 at p. 173). 
In fact, High Valley should itself be estopped from asserting any claim inconsistent 
with the sale of the water to SCI. High Valley's own actions suggest an acceptance of 
SCFs claim to the water. In particular, High Valley allowed SCI to file a temporary 
change application on the water subject to the Option. (R. 346 Ex. P-7). If High Valley 
truly believed the Option had not been exercised, it would have undoubtedly protested 
SCFs temporary change application. High Valley also acquiesced when SCI pledged its 
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interest in the water subject to the Option to Summit County as security toward certain 
improvements. The mere fact that High Valley improperly chose to rely upon the use of 
the water it had already sold to SCI is no basis to estop, or otherwise deny, SCI's claim. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, together with those set forth in the Brief of 
Appellant, SCI respectfully asks the Court to reverse the district court's determination, 
finding that the Option remains valid and binding upon the parties and that High Valle^y 
must complete performance of its obligations under the Option. 
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of September, 2005. 
CLYDE SNOW SESSION & SWENSON 
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